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CONSUMER CONTRACTS AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW
ANDREAS P. REINDL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to complement the Symposium's discussion
of UCC-specific consumer protection issues with an overview of recent
consumer protection developments in the European Community
("Community"). The debate about consumer rights in the revision process of
UCC Article 2 coincides with efforts in the European Community to adopt
legislation concerning consumer contracts. To illustrate the policies and
current status of Community consumer law, this paper focuses on legislative
initiatives related to unfair contract terms and warranty rights in consumer
contracts.
The paper consists of two parts. The first provides a general overview of
consumer protection activities in the European Community. The first part's
main theme is the relationship between Community law and Member State
consumer protection laws. It explains why the Community's market
integration efforts and diversity among Member States' consumer protection
laws had a predominant influence on the current status of Community
consumer protection laws.
The second part explores existing and proposed European Community
legislation designed to ensure protection of consumer economic interests.
Specifically, it critically discusses two Community harmonization measures
governing warranties and warranty-related contract terms in consumer
contracts.
The paper's conclusions are twofold: First, the Community's principal
task remains the harmonization of existing Member State consumer
protection laws. The Community is less likely to succeed in attempts to
advance the level of protection beyond existing standards in Member State
laws. The Community's constitutional background suggests that significant
improvements in this area are better left to national laws and national courts.
Practical experience supports this conclusion.
* Research Fellow, Research Institute for European Affairs, Vienna, Austria. The author
wishes to thank Diane Mego, American University Washington College of Law '96, for her excellent
research assistance.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Second, in the area of consumer contract rights, progress on the "federal"
level toward greater consumer rights has been only incremental. The diversity
of Member States' contract laws significantly restricts the Community's
ability to advance consumer rights in this area.
II. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, FEDERALISM, AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION
Key to understanding the Community's consumer protection activities are
the Community's market integration goal and the potential conflict between
market integration and Member State regulation to protect consumer
interests.'
The drafters of the European Economic Community Treaty ("EEC
Treaty")2 apparently were satisfied that consumers would benefit from the
effects of market integration in general. Increased supply of products and
greater competition would drive prices down and improve the consumers'
choice. Promotion of economic integration and free movement of goods
therefore became the principal motivation for Community institutions to act
in the area of consumer protection. At the outset, the desire to confer greater
rights on consumers in the Community, independent of integration goals,
played no important role
Consumer protection nevertheless has played a role in the Community's
activities. Since the early 1970s, the Community has developed a consumer
protection policy and adopted consumer protection related legislative acts.4
1. See also Xavier Lewis, The Protection of Consumers in European Law, 1992 Y.B. EUR. L.
139, 167 (1993); David Trubek, Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism: Introduction and
General Concepts, in THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE & DAVID TRUBEK, CONSUMER LAW, COMMON
MARKETS AND FEDERALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 2 (1987).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 LL.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU or Maastricht Treaty], amended the EEC Treaty in several aspects. Article G(1) of the TEU, for
example, changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Community
("EC") and therefore changed the EEC Treaty into the EC Treaty. It also changed several provisions in
the EC Treaty and introduced new provisions. For the consolidated version of the TEU and the EC
Treaty, see 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1. Later references are to the Treaty refer to the EC Treaty as modified
by the TEU unless otherwise noted as the EEC Treaty in which case the references) refers to the pre-
TEU EEC Treaty. The European Union did not replace, however, the European Community. The
European Union and the European Community coexist as two distinct legal systems, even though they
share certain institutions. Consumer protection is exclusively based on EC law and the paper therefore
uses only this term.
3. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part l.B.1.
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The following part explores the legal environment and the motives for
Community consumer protection action. It focuses on the Community's
market integration project and the relationship between Community law and
Member State consumer protection laws. Member State consumer protection
measures, on the one hand, came into conflict with the Community's market
integration goal.5 On the other hand, advancements in market integration have
become the catalyst for new measures to protect consumer interests on the
Community level.6
A. Where Market Integration and Consumer Protection Collide: Free
Movement Rules and National Consumer Protection
Member State regulations to protect local consumer interests may restrict
free trade in products or services and therefore create obstacles to market
integration. Free movement principles to ensure market access for products
and services from other Member States limit a Member State's ability to
effectively protect consumers by domestic legislation "Negative"
integration, based on deregulation and the removal of trade barriers, may even
reduce the level of protection achieved by a Member State.
Pressure on Member State regulations was significant in particular with
respect to product-related measures. It has been far less important with
respect to restrictions resulting from diverse Member State contract laws.
1. Free Movement Rules
By far the most important Treaty provision with respect to free movement
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part H.B.
7. Community legislation or legislative initiatives may also change the negotiating positions of
interest groups in Member States and retard the passage of advanced consumer protection legislation.
Evidence provided by Member States suggests that in some cases opponents of new legislation
successfully argued that going beyond the Community-wide level of protection would harm the
competitive position of the domestic industry. See, e.g., Agnes Chambraud et al., The Importance of
Community Law for French Consumer Protection Legislation, 17 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 23, 28-29
(1994) (discussing opposition to proposed introduction of class action A la americaine into French
law); Hans Peter Lehofer, Minimum Implementation of Minimum Directives? Consumer Protection in
Austria in the Context of European Integration, 17 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 3, 12 (1994) (national action
delayed, in particular in the interest of industry, because of expected EC initiatives); see also Trubek,
supra note 1, at 4 (suggesting that political reasons may inhibit the independent passage of consumer-
protection laws in Member States since the greater mobility of production factors may enable a firm to
threaten to move to another Member State if the first Member State's consumer-protection laws create
an unfavorable business climate).
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rules is Article 30. It prohibits Member States from adopting or maintaining
import restrictions and measures with equivalent effect. Pursuant to the prior
wide interpretation of Article 30 given by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities ("Court"), every Member State measure that actually
or potentially, directly or indirectly restricts intra-Community trade fell within
Article 30.'
Accordingly, a number of Member State measures designed to protect
consumer interests were found to violate Article 30. Examples are advertising
restrictions,9 prohibitions from door-to-door sales,' ° prohibitions from
offering free gifts to promote sales," and restrictions concerning food
ingredients.
12
In 1993 the Court limited the scope of Article 30. The Court held in Keck
v. Mithouard that Member State measures that regulated only the marketing
and not the contents or appearance of products fell outside Article 30,
provided they equally affected imported and domestic products.'3 Keck
marked an important development under Article 30. It may not be highly
significant for most consumer protection measures, however, with the
possible exception of advertising restrictions.' 4
There is no explicit exception for consumer protection related measures
from Article 30's prohibition of import restricting measures.'" Faced with the
8. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. It used to be irrelevant whether
Member State measures distinguish between imported and domestic products. The ECJ even denied
that a de minimis exception might limit the scope of Article 30. See, e.g., Case C-145/88, Torfaen
Burough Council v. B & Q plc., 1989 E.C.R. 3851; Joined Cases 177 & 178/82, van de Haar, 1984
E.C.R. 1797.
9. Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Conf6d& tion du commerce luxembourgeois, 1990 E.C.R
1-667; Joined Cases C-1/90 & C-176/90, Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA v. Departmento de
Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Catalufia, 1991 E.C.R. 14151.
10. Case C-382/87, Buet v. Minist&e public, 1989 E.C.R. 1235 (forcing trader to discontinue
particularly effective selling scheme may restrict imports even if prohibition applies to domestic and
imported products alike).
11. Case C-286/81, Oosthoek's Vitgeversmaatshappij BV, 1982 E.C.R. 4575.
12. See infra note 22.
13. Joined Cases C-267 & C-268/91, Keck v. Mithouard, 1994 E.C.R. 1-6097.
14. The exact effects of Keck are still undetermined. It is clear, however, that any kind of import
restriction imposed on specific products, restrictions on the use of foreign languages or any other
measure that affects imported goods more than domestic goods will not benefit from the Keck's
narrowing of Article 30's scope. Measures that restrict the freedom to provide services are not affected
by Keck either.
15. Article 36 of the Treaty provides for exceptions from Article 30's prohibition for a limited
number of reasons, including, for example, the protection of public health, intellectual property rights
or cultural objects. The Court held that the Article 36 list is exhaustive.
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dilemma of an overly broad definition of "unlawful restrictions on intra-
Community trade" and the lack of an explicit exception for Member State
regulations in several important policy areas,' 6 the Court recognized that
certain "mandatory requirements," including the protection of consumer
interests, may justify restrictions on intra-Community trade. Member State
measures to protect consumer interests may therefore justify restrictions on
intra-Community trade, provided that they are necessary and proportional. 7
The broad application of Article 30, combined with the Court-created
exceptions from Article 30's prohibition, effectively enabled the Court to
examine a wide range of Member State regulations for their compatibility
with Community law. A significant number of Member State consumer
protection measures were found incompatible with Community law.
Examples are Member State prohibitions from using certain ingredients in
foods," restrictions on permissible names and packaging, 9 and advertising
restrictions.2"
Importantly, the Court was in the position to examine and invalidate laws
that were in fact based on protectionist motives, even though Member States
attempted to defend them on consumer protection grounds. The Court's strict
scrutiny of Member State consumer protection provisions and its
differentiation between "real" consumer protection measures and those with a
protectionist motive arguably was a major contribution to the market
integration goal.2'
A fundamental concept in the Court's free movement jurisprudence is the
principle of mutual recognition. The mutual recognition principle assumes
16. Other possible exceptions from Article 30 that are not listed in Article 36 concern
environmental protection measures and laws against unfair competition.
17. See, e.g., Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerb K6ln e.V. v. Mars,
1994 E.C.R. 1-1923; Case C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V. v. Yves
Rocher GmbH, 1993 E.C.R- 1-2361; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Burdesmonopolverwaltung fir
Branntwein ("Cassis de Dijon"), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
18. See, e.g., Case C-178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227
(purity of beer); Case C-788179, Gilli, 1980 E.C.R. 2071 (only vinegar made from wine permitted).
19. See, e.g., Case C-315/92, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb e.V v. Clinique Laboratories SNC,
1994 E.C.R. 1-317 (prohibition from using name "Clinique" for cosmetic products); Case C-261/81,
Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PvbA, 1982 E.C.R. 3961 (prohibition against marketing
margarine in containers not having a cubic form).
20. Case C-126/71, Yves Rocher, 1993 E.C.R. 1-2361 (prohibition from advertising with
comparative prices); Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Conf6d6ration du commerce luxembourgeois,
1990 E.C.R. 1-667 (prohibition from advertising sales promotions); Case C-152/78, Commission v.
France, 1980 E.C.R. 2299 (prohibition against advertising of certain groups of alcoholic drinks).
21. JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 292 (1993).
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that products that are marketable in one Member State generally are
marketable throughout the Community, unless the Member State of import
can justify restrictions on intra-Community trade.22
Consumer advocates have occasionally questioned whether the Court has
gone too far in its market integration efforts.2 They have expressed concern
that the Court's case law and the application of the mutual recognition
principle may undermine the existing level of protection in some Member
States.2
4
2. Free Movement of Contract Laws
Restrictions on intra-Community trade may also arise because cross-
border transactions are potentially subject to a variety of different national
contract laws. The problem is particularly acute if a service provider or seller
enters into agreements with consumers in another Member State.25
22. See, e.g., Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649; see also, e.g., Case C-315/92,
Clinique, 1994 E.C.Rt 1-317. Thus, the responsibility for supervising product quality and safety and
the product's conformity with regulations is shifted to the Member State where the product is put on
the market the first time. The mutual recognition principle is therefore also known as the country-of-
origin principle.
The only area where the ECJ followed a more conservative approach is health related measures
that were based on scientific evidence. See, e.g., Case C-344/90, Commission v. France, 1992 E.C.R.
1-4719 (nitrates in cheese); Case 304/84, Minist&re public v. Muller, 1986 E.C.tL 1511 (additives in
foodstuffs); Case 53/80, Officier van Justitie v. KaastabriefEyssen, 1981 E.C.R 409 (prohibition from
using nisin in cheese). But see Joined Cases C-13/91 & C-113/91, Debus, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3617
(restrictions from using sulphur dioxide in beer found disproportionate because not supported by
scientific evidence).
23. For an example of a close case in which the court appeared less concerned with local
consumer interests than with market integration policy, see Case C-407/85, 3 Glocken GmbH v. USL
Centro-Sud, 1988 E.C.R. 4233. The issue before the court was whether Italian legislation that
permitted only the use of durum wheat for pasta and thus prevented the marketing of German pasta
under the name "pasta" in Italy was compatible with Community law. The Advocate General and
several Member States had suggested that legitimate consumer protection motives justified the
restriction on intra-Community trade and that deregulation would result in consumer confusion, even
with labelling requirements. The court disagreed and held that imports could not be restricted.
Labelling requirements were sufficient in the court's view to protect consumer interests.
24. See Trubek, supra note 1, at 3-4 (observing that individual Member States may have become
increasingly reluctant to individually adopt consumer-protection measures as a consequence of the
ECJ's aggressive market integration case law which made challenges to new regulatory laws more'
likely); see also Monique Goyens, Consumer Protection in a Single European Market: What
Challenge for the EC Agenda?, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 71 (1992) (mutual-recognition principle
may reduce level of consumers protection); Hans-W. Micklitz & Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Policy
in the European Community: Before andAfter Maastricht, 16 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 285, at 290 (1993).
25. Regarding the freedom to provide services, the relevant Treaty provisions are Articles 59
through 66. They prohibit Member State restrictions on the freedom to provide services across borders.
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Frequently, choice-of-law rules will provide for the mandatory application of
domestic contract rules to consumer contracts. This will prevent the
"exporting" of the seller's or service provider's contract law.26
In principle the issue should be highly significant in the Community,
given the diversity of Member State contract laws. It may complicate cross-
border activities, in particular from the point of view of sellers and service
providers. Diversity of Member States' contract laws may also affect
consumers' interests if one shares the assumption that the lack of knowledge
of a foreign contract law may prevent a consumer from entering into a
transaction in another Member State. Indeed, the Commission has argued that
the diversity of contract laws restricts the "free movement of consumers."'27
Mandatory Member State choice-of-law rules rejecting the application of
another Member State contract law and requiring the application of domestic
consumer protection legislation to protect its consumers may conflict with
Community law, in particular with the freedom to provide services. A strict
application of the country-of-origin concept would suggest that service
providers should be able to offer their services in other Member States under
the contract rules of their home Member State.2"
Interestingly, the issue of the contract law applicable to cross border
transactions played a far less important role in the Court's case law than
product-related restrictions. The court never held that mandatory choice of
law rules in favor of domestic consumers infringed Community law. On the
contrary, the 1980 Rome Convention concerning the law applicable to
Articles 59 and 60 prohibit not only any form of discrimination against foreign service providers, but
any kind of restriction, unless such restriction is justified in the public interest, including consumer
interests. See Case C-180/89, Commission v. Italy, 1991 E.C.Rt 1-709 (tourist guides); Case 205/84,
Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3755 (insurance). Article 59's prohibition
from restricting intra-Community services may be even stricter than the parallel prohibition in Article
30 concerning intra-Community trade in products. See Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister
van Financien, 1995 E.C.L 1-1141.
26. For a brief discussion of choice-of-law problems in connection with consumer contracts, see
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and
After-Sale Services, COM(93) 509 final, at 67-71 [hereinafter Warranty Green Paper]; see also Bemd
von Hoffmann, Consumer Contracts and the 1980 Rome EC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, 15 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 365 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Warranty Green Paper, supra note 26, at 14.
28. On the country-of-origin concept and its importance for market integration, see supra note 22
and accompanying text. Several German commentators argued, for example, that banks should benefit
from the country-of-origin principle and be able to offer services (their "legal product") throughout the
Community subject to their domestic contract law. See Manfred Wolf, Privates Bankvertragsrecht im
EG-Binnenmarkt: Auswirkungen der I1. EG-Bankrechts-Richtlinie auf privaterechtliche
Bankgeschafie, 44 WERTPAPIER MITTEILUNGEN 1941 (1990).
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contracts29 as well as Community legislation recognized that restrictions on
the parties' freedom to choose the applicable law are justified on consumer
protection grounds. The Rome Convention recognized the right to apply,
under certain conditions, the law of the consumer's country of residence to
sales and service contracts with consumers.3" Secondary Community law in
the area of insurance law also restricts the free choice of law in favor of the
mandatory application of the law of the consumer's country of residence to
protect consumer interests. 3'
Rules concerning the applicable contract law also depend on the
harmonization of Member State contract laws. The greater the diversity, the
more justified appear the mandatory choice-of-law rules to protect domestic
consumers. This relationship first became apparent when attempts to
harmonize Member State insurance contract laws failed in the late 1970s.1
2
As a consequence of the failed harmonization efforts, existing Community
directives in the insurance sector recognize the diversity between Member
State contract laws and permit Member States to provide for the mandatory
application of domestic contract law where the policyholder is a consumer.33
The widely accepted reliance on choice-of-law rules for consumer
29. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 ("Rome
Convention"). The Rome Convention entered into force in 1991. See, e.g., Ole Lando, The EC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 159 (1987).
30. Article 5 of the Rome Convention provides that the mandatory rules of the consumer's
country of residence apply to consumer contracts. If the seller solicited the consumer in the consumer's
country of residence and the contract was actually concluded there or if the consumer traveled from his
country of residence to another country and that journey was arranged by the seller, then the seller's
agent acted in the consumer's country of residence. The parties' choice of another law is valid only if it
is permissible under the choice-of-law rules of the consumer's country of residence.
31. Second Council Directive on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative
procedures relating to direct insurance other than life insurance and laying down provisions to
facilitate the effective exercise of the freedom to provide services and amending Directive
73/239/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 172) 1, art. 7 (as amended by Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L
228) 1) [hereinafter Second Non-Life Directive).
32. For the relevant Commission proposals, see 1979 O.J. (C 190) 2, amended by 1980 O.J. (C
355) 30.
33. See Second Non-Life Directive, 1988 O.J. (L 172) 1, art. 7. The insurance directives
incorporate an interesting set of hybrid rules. Administrative supervision, on the one hand, is based on
the country-of-origin principle with supervision in the insurance company's home country. Contract
choice-of-law rules, on the other hand, are much more restrictive. Free choice-of-law principles are
limited to insurance contracts for commercial risks, unless a given Member State allows for more
flexible choice-of-law rules in the case of consumer' contracts. For a discussion of choice-of-law
problems in insurance contracts under EC law, see vulf-Henning Roth, EC Treaty Article Fifty.Nine
and Its Implications for Conflicts Law in the Field of Insurance Contracts, 1992 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 129; Ben Smulders & Paul Glazener, Harmonization in the Field ofInsurance Lav Through
the Introduction of Community Rules of Conflict, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 775 (1992).
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protection is significant also in a second context. Restrictions on the free
provision of services that may result from diverse contract laws and
mandatory choice-of-law rules apparently have not been significant in the
common market. At least, service providers or sellers have not initiated
litigation against the Member State choice-of-law rules on the grounds that
they infringe Community law. Neither have they successfully lobbied for
Community action. This absence of major controversies may explain in part
why the Community's market integration efforts have in the past not
prioritized projects to harmonize Member State contract laws.34
B. Positive Market Integration: "Federal" Consumer Protection
It is important to note that market integration has not only focussed on the
enforcement of free movement principles against Member State measures that
restricted intra-Community trade. Market integration has also induced
consumer protection initiatives on the Community level to ensure a minimum
level of protection throughout all Member States. The Community has
therefore become a source of "positive" market integration in the area of
consumer protection.35 There are several explanations for this relationship
between negative and positive market integration.
First, negative market integration alone is insufficient to complete the
single market. In cases where consumer protection motives justify Member
State restrictions on intra-Community trade, for example, harmonization on
the Community level is required to reduce trade barriers. Although the
removal of trade barriers and creation of equal competitive market conditions
are the principal goals of such harmonization measures, they will incidentally
affect consumer protection. Consumer protection directives frequently
mention this dual purpose.36
The mutual recognition principle, moreover, cannot be applied in all cases
where differences between Member State laws exist. The above discussion of
34. See also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
35. "Positive" market integration refers to regulatory measures on the EC level or at least
harmonization of Member State regulatory measures in the area of consumer protection.
36. See, e.g., Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the member states concerning liability for defective products ("Product Liability
Directive"), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (recital I states that different liability standards for defective
products distorts competition, restricts intra-Community trade, and results in different levels of
consumer protection).
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Member State contract law is an example of this problem. Here, again,
harmonization is necessary to create equal market conditions. 7
Commentators have also argued that strict scrutiny of national laws under
free movement principles has encouraged Member States to accept greater
Community involvement. As Member States lose the ability to individually
adopt consumer protection measures that do not violate Community law, they
consider action at the Community level the most effective way to ensure
protection of consumer interests."
Finally, the creation of a single, integrated market has increased the
demand for "independent" consumer rights. In particular, those who do not
believe that market liberalization and increased competition alone will
automatically ensure that consumers are in fact the market integration
project's ultimate beneficiaries, demanded Community measures that are not
directly related to the removal of trade barriers to create a "consumer-
friendly" single market. They have criticized the Community's focus on
market integration as a justification for consumer protection measures.39
The next part will briefly describe the Community's consumer protection
programs and legislative measures, with particular emphasis on measures to
protect the economic interests of consumers. It will then analyze two factors
that explain the limited scope of the Community's consumer protection
activities: First, the restrictions on the Community's legislative powers and,
second, the institutional arrangement that has limited the influence of those
Community institutions and organizations that have been the strongest
supporters of consumer rights.
37. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Goyens, supra note 24, at 71; see also Thieny Bourgoignie, Consumer Law and the
European Community: Issues and Prospects, in BOURGOIGNIE & TRUBEK, supra note I, at 111.
Bourgoignie argues that the "regulatory-gap thesis," originally created in the U.S. debate of federalism,
is also applicable in the Community. After the constituent units agreed to open their borders, central
law may be the only effective form of adopting new regulation because a single market will make
regulation at the constituent unit level ineffective. Bourgoignie refers to the example of Denmark and
the United Kingdom as new Member States in the 1970s which supported the Commission's consumer
protection efforts. Id. at 119-20.
39. See, e.g., Goyens, supra note 24, at 73 (criticizing the Commission's 1990 three-year action
plan because it viewed consumer protection primarily as an aspect of market integration without giving
priority to issues that are not directly linked with the completion of the internal market); Bourgoignie,
supra note 38, at 145; Micklitz & Weatherill, supra note 24, at 294 (observing that even in the late
1980s, market integration and the role of consumers as beneficiaries of the common market
increasingly influenced the definition of the Community's consumer protection policy, whereas the
focus on consumer rights diminished).
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1. Consumer Policy Programs and Legislation
The Community has in the past twenty years adopted a number of
consumer policy declarations and programs. The Council adopted consumer
protection programs in 1975 and 1981.40 Resolutions addressing consumer
protection issues followed.4' Since 1990 the Commission has adopted three
consumer protection action plans.42
The 1975 program included an ambitious consumer protection agenda in
five separate areas, including the right to information and education, the right
of representation, consumer access to justice, and consumer health and
safety. 3 It already mentioned the protection of economic interests, including
consumer contract issues such as unfair contract terms and guarantees, as an
area of priority Community action.'
Among the three-year action programs which the Commission adopted
since 1990, perhaps the most significant is the 1995 program that introduced
new issues on the Community agenda, such as the position of consumers in
the information society and the protection of consumer interests with regard
to public services.45
An analysis of concrete legislative acts reveals a different picture. Many of
the items listed in the consumer protection programs did not result in concrete
measures, at least not within the short term. The Commission first proposed
legislative measures in the mid-1970s. The first directives relating to the
40. Council Resolution, First Program, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1; Council Resolution, Second Program,
1981 O.J. (C 133) 1.
41. See, e.g., Council Resolution concerning the future orientation of the policy of the European
Economic Community for the protection and promotion of consumer interests, 1986 O.J. (C 167) 1
(based on the Commission Paper, A New Impetus for Consumer Protection Policy, COM(85)354
final); Council Resolution, 1988 O.J. (C 293) 1; Council Resolution on Future Priorities for
Relaunching Consumer Protection Policy, 1989 O.J. (C 294) 1. For further references, see Lewis,
supra note 1, at 148.
42. Commission of the European Communities, First Three-Year Action Plan, COM(90)98, at 17
(mentioning general terms of contract, access to justice and teleshopping); Commission of the
European Communities, Second Three-Year Action Plan, COM(93) 378; Priorities of Consumer
Policy 1996-1998, COM(95) 519.
43. Council Resolution, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1. For a summary, see DOMINIK LASOK & J.W.
BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 726-28 (6th ed. 1994).
44. Council Resolution, First Program, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1; see also Council Resolution, Second
Program, 1981 O.J. (C 133) 1. The items requiring legislation listed in the first program included
unfair contract terms and contract terms that excluded consumer contract rights, abusive credit terms,
misleading advertising, after-sale services and protection against defective products.
45. Communication from the Commission, Priorities of Consumer Policy 1996-1998, COM(95)
519 final.
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protection of consumer economic interests, however, were adopted about ten
years later.46 After the adoption of the first program, it took fifteen years for
the Commission to adopt a proposal to harmonize contract terms, including
warranty-related terms.
Nevertheless, the Community has been able to adopt six directives related
to the protection of the consumer's economic interests. These directives
include product liability;47 door-to-door sales;48 misleading advertising;"
consumer credits;50 package travel, package holidays, and package tours;5
time share agreements;52 and unfair contract terms. 3 Other proposals are
currently pending.
5 4
A possible "test case" for the Community's ability to adopt further
legislation to advance consumer protection is the issue of consumer access to
justice. Access to justice and enforcement of rights undoubtedly are key
issues for effective consumer protection.55 In fact, these issues have been on
the Community agenda since the first consumer protection program in 1975.
Procedural law, however, traditionally has been a domain of Member State
competence. 6 Also Member States did not accept any limitation of their
exclusive powers concerning the organization of courts and administrative
agencies. This might explain why the Community has not yet been able to
adopt any concrete measures.57 In 1996, however, the Community finally
46. See, e.g., Commission Proposal for a Product Liability Directive, 1976 O.J. (C 241) 9. The
directive was finally adopted in 1985. Council Directive, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
47. Council Directive, 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29.
48. Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.3. (L 372) 31.
49. Council Directive 84/450, 1984 O.J. (L 250) 17.
50. Council Directive 87/102, 1987 O.3. (L 42) 48.
51. Council Directive 90/314, 1990 OJ. (L 158) 59.
52. Directive 94/47 of the European Parliament and the Council, 1994 O.J. (L 95) 29.
53. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 0.3. (L 95) 29.
54. Proposal for a Directive on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, 1992
O.J. (C 156) 5, 14, amended by 1993 OJ. (C 308) 18 and COM(96) 36 final. The directive was
adopted in January 1997 when the Council and Parliament reached an agreement on the final text. See
AGENCE EUROPE NO. 6894, at 10 (Jan. 17, 1997); Proposal fora Directive on sales of consumer goods
and guarantees, 1996 OJ. (C 307) 8; see infra note 163 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 1, at 172.
56. Community law has so far imposed on Member States only a prohibition from adopting or
maintaining discriminatory procedural rules and the obligation to provide effective remedies to enforce
rights based on Community law.
57. An exception is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1978 O.3. (L 304) 1, a treaty concluded among Member
States which regulates issues like jurisdiction of courts and recognition of judgments in disputes
involving nationals from different Member States. Article 14 of the Brussels Convention enables a
consumer plaintiffto bring an action in the courts of the Member State where she is domiciled.
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took the first steps to improve consumer access to justice."
From the relatively short list of concrete legislative acts it is apparent that
the Community's aim is not a systematic harmonization of Member State
contract laws or the creation of a comprehensive consumer protection code.
Harmonization has occurred instead in areas where differences between
Member State laws arguably resulted in the most obvious trade distortions.
The Commission recently affirmed that legislative acts were not intended to
create a harmonized European contract law out of the current diversity of
different Member State laws. 9
The analysis of the directive relating to unfair contract terms in the second
part will demonstrate, moreover, that Community directives in general have
not significantly advanced the level of protection, when compared with
existing Member State laws.'
2. Factors Influencing the Community's Consumer Protection Agenda
The following part explores explanations for the Community's limited
scope of legislative initiatives concerning the protection of consumer
economic interests, compared with more ambitious consumer protection
policy. The discussion focusses on two factors: The constitutional
background of the Treaty and the interests of the institutions involved in the
legislative process.
a. Constitutional Powers
The Community's limited constitutional powers explain at least in part
why all consumer protection measures in the Community traditionally have
58. See Commission Proposal for a Parliament and Council Directive on Cessation Actions
Relating to the Defense of Collective Consumer Interests, 1996 O.J. (C 107) 3; AGENCE EUROPE, No.
6859, at 10 (Nov. 23, 1996) (reporting political discussions within Council about cross-border
collective consumer actions and settlements of consumer disputes in the internal market).
59. See, e.g., Commission Proposal for a Parliament and Council Directive on the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees, COM(95) 520 final, at 7 [hereinafter Warranty Directive
Proposal].
60. See infra Part II.B.2. This paper concentrates on the unfair contract terms directive, Council
Directive, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, and will not focus on other directives related to consumer protection
that arguably did have a positive effect on the level of protection, One example is the Council
Directive on Package Travel, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59, which combined various Member State consumer
protection techniques. The result is a relatively high standard of protection that includes information
obligations, a reversal of proof that inadequate performance or partial nonperformance was not the
travel organizer's or the travel agent's fault and the establishment of an obligatory liability funds.
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pursued a dual goal of facilitating intra-Community trade and improving
consumer protection. The EEC Treaty provided no explicit mandate to adopt
consumer protection measures. It mentioned the protection of consumer
interests only in connection with the removal of barriers to trade. The
Community's competence to act in consumer protection matters was
"incidental" to the power to adopt market integration measures and legislate
in other policy areas such as agricultural policy and competition policy.6' This
lack of authorization to legislate in a specific area is significant because
Community law in principle is based upon the concept of enumerated
powers.62
Until 1987, legislative measures relating to consumer protection had to be
based on Article 100, which authorizes legislation in connection with the
functioning of the common market. Article 100 not only provides as limited
legal basis for consumer protection legislation. It also became a major reason
for the delay in the adoption of Community measures, because it requires a
unanimous vote by the Council. A single Member State therefore could
oppose the adoption of new legislation.
In 1987 the Single European Act63 introduced Article 100a into the EEC
Treaty. Article 100a authorizes the Community to adopt legislation in
connection with the creation of the internal market. Article 100a has almost
entirely replaced Article 100 and become the exclusive basis for consumer
related legislation. Importantly, Article 100a requires the Council's approval
only by majority vote. Yet, Article 100a still is concerned with market
61. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 39 (supply of agricultural products must reach
consumers at reasonable prices); id. art. 85(3) (exemption from Article 85(I)'s prohibition of
restrictive agreements permissible only if consumers will benefit); see also Bourgoignie, supra note
38, at 89, 98-101 (consumer interests are considered as a by product of more fundamental Community
policies such as intra-Community trade and increased competition); Micklitz & Weatherill, supra note
24, at 292.
The Product Liability Directive, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, provides a good illustration for the
Community's focus on market integration aspects. Article 9(1)(b) of the directive provides that the
directive's strict liability regime shall apply only to property damages exceeding 500 European
Currency Units ("ECtJ"). If the directive were solely a consumer protection instrument, Member States
presumably would have discretion to improve the consumer's position by lowering or deleting the 500
ECU threshold. In the Commission's view, however, Member States must maintain this minimum
threshold. The Commission argues that the directive also aims at creating equal competitive conditions
for producers.
62. Community legislative acts moreover must refer to a specific EC Treaty provision as their
legal bases to be valid. See, e.g., Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.1. 1493, But see
Bourgoignie, supra note 38, at 124-26 (arguing that Community institutions' recognition of promotion
of consumer interests as Community objective granted the EC the authority to act in this area).
63. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (official publication of Single European Act).
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integration and the removal of trade barriers. It provides no legal basis for
consumer protection measures independent of the market integration goal.
Since 1993 the EC Treaty has explicitly recognized the Community's
authority to adopt measures in the area of consumer protection, without
requiring a direct connection with market integration.' Article 129a provides
for the attainment of greater protection of consumers not only through
internal market measures based on Article 100a, but also through specific
consumer protection action to supplement and support Member State
policies."
Whether the adoption of Article 129a will dramatically change the
situation appears uncertain. In the view of some commentators, the inclusion
of Article 129a represents a significant change in the legal environment. Their
main argument is that Article 129a separates consumer protection from
market integration and eliminates possible legal obstacles to expanding
consumer protection legislation."
The more persuasive view is that Article 129a is unlikely to expand the
Community's ability and willingness to adopt legislative measures. Article
129a certainly does not provide a broad mandate for future Community
actions, and even before the adoption of Article 129a, no serious
constitutional limits for Community action in the area of consumer policy
existed.67 A decisive factor in the past was and continues to be the political
commitment of Community institutions and, in particular, Member States to
adopt Community consumer protection measures.6"
The Maastricht Treaty actually may reduce the scope for Community
activities in this area because the principle of subsidiarity was enshrined in the
64. In addition, Article 3(s), added by the TEU, identifies consumer protection as one of the
Community's goals.
65. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 129a(1)(b).
66. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 1, at 150; Micklitz & Weatherill, supra note 24, at 298-99.
67. Legislative measures could always be based on Article t00 or Article 235 and, since 1987, on
Article 100a. Article 100a's new voting rules brought a change that arguably was more significant than
the introduction of Article 129a, because the majority vote requirement permits the Council to adopt
legislation in connection with the establishment of the internal market over the opposition of one or a
few Member States.
68. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text; Micklitz & Weatherill, supra note 24, at 299
(acknowledge that Article 129a's practical impact is uncertain at best); see also Borge Dahli, Consumer
Protection Within the European Union, 16 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 345, 348-51 (1993) (referring to the
Danish government's interpretation of Article 129a which would not broaden the scope of an
independent Community consumer protection policy); Lewis, supra note 1, at 151 (Community action
based on Article 129a can only be minimal and may arguably only support, but not harmonize, existing
Member State laws).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
EC Treaty.69
b. Institutions and Interests Represented
This is not the place to describe in any detail the composition and function
of Community institutions.7° The following part will briefly discuss how the
most important Community institutions are represented in the Community's
decision making process. It will demonstrate that the Member States still
exercise decisive control over the legislative process. Institutions and
organizations that favor greater Community involvement in consumer
protection issues, like the European Parliament, have less influence.
i) Commission
The Commission frequently is described as the Community's executive
branch.7' It plays a crucial role, however, in the legislative process. The
Commission has the exclusive right to propose Community acts and has far
reaching powers during the deliberations of its legislative proposals.72
The Commission's commitment to a consumer protection policy has been
69. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3b. Consumer advocates appear to be concerned about possible
repercussion of the emphasis in subsidiarity on consumer protection on the Community level. See, e.g.,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION, REPORT CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION NO. A3-0380/92 (1992) (warning
against use of subsidiarity to "renationalize" consumer protection activities); Leigh Gibson,
Subsidiarity: The Implications for Consumer'Policy, 16 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 323 (1993); Micklitz &
Weatherill, supra note 24, at 304-16;
The Commission's second three-year action plan, COM(93)378 final, already put greater
emphasis on subsidiarity. The Commission mentioned that two proposed directives concerning
liability for services and comparative advertising were examined under the subsidiarity concept. Plans
to harmonize after sale services were apparently abandoned in light of the subsidiarity principle. See
Commission, Warranty Directive Proposal, COM(95) 520 final, at 8.
70. Examples of textbooks covering in great detail Community institutions are T.C. HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3d ed. 1994); LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 43;
SHAW, supra note 21; and DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3d
ed. 1993).
71. Important Commission powers related to the role as executive branch include the
implementation of Community legislation and enforcement of Community law by bringing actions
before the Court of Justice against Member States in violation of their treaty obligations. See EC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 155.
72. The Commission can at any time before the Council has voted on a proposal withdraw or
change a text, EC Treaty, supra note 2, art.189a(2). The Council moreover must vote with unanimity
to amend a Commission proposal, EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189a(I).
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decisive for Community initiatives in this area.' For the Commission,
expanding activities into a new area provided the opportunity to search for
additional legitimacy and develop its own policies in a generally popular area.
Moreover, focussing on consumer protection enabled the Commission to
define an area where it could act independently of the growing influence of
Member State governments.
ii) Council and Member States
Member States are represented in the Council, which resembles the
Community's legislative branch. The Council's approval is required for every
piece of legislation, in most cases by a qualified majority of votes.74
Moreover, Member States have expanded their influence on the legislative
process beyond the limited role initially envisaged in the EC Treaty. Member
State representatives today consult with Commission officials at an early
stage of the legislative process and help shape proposals before the
Commission officially submits them to the Council and Parliament.
Certain Member States have traditionally supported the development of a
consumer protection policy on the Community level. In particular those
Member States with a high level of consumer protection saw increased
activities on the Community level as the most effective way to prevent the
erosion of the achievements on the national level.75
It is also true, however, that Member States (or the entire Council) have
opposed consumer protection legislation in general or at least certain
provisions in proposed legislation. This resistance may in part be caused by
suspicion that Community measures will reduce existing standards of
protection.76 In other cases, opposition could also result from the Member
73. Because of the Commission's role during the drafting of legislative proposals, it is also the
main target for "external influence" like business interests and consumer groups. Interestingly,
participation by academics is not remarkably strong, at least it is not institutionalized.
74. The Council has for certain areas delegated such authority to the Commission. In rare cases,
the EC Treaty directly authorizes the Commission to adopt legally binding measures. See, e.g., EC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 90(3) (legislation related to state monopolies).
75. Bourgoignie, supra note 38, at 119-20 (referring in particular to Denmark and the United
Kingdom).
76. VIVIENNE KENDALL, EC CONSUMER LAW 8 (1994). One example of diverging Member State
and Community priorities that delayed Community action is the first attempt to legislate in the area of
unfair contract terms. The Commission envisaged Community legislation for the first time in 1975.
Member States, however, had already adopted legislation or had just started their legislative process.
The Commission abandoned its plan. See COM(90)322 final, at 10.
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State view that Community legislation is not necessary or is not compatible
with existing Member State regulations."
Although some commentators believe that diversity between Member
State laws is less significant than sometimes argued,78 national interests
always are difficult to overcome.79 Differences presumably play a particularly
important role in areas that involve traditional legal principles of law such as
contracts, torts, and procedure."0 Perhaps in these areas the perception that
integration and harmonization on the Community level concurrently led to
disintegration on the Member State level was strongest and therefore,
opposition in the Council was most significant.8"
iii) Parliament
The European Parliament, probably the most committed advocate of
consumer interests among the Community institutions, 2 always supported the
Commission's consumer protection agenda. This was true even at a time
when the Parliament had almost no influence on the decisionmaking process
and its members were not elected by popular vote. 3 Promoting consumer
protection served the Parliament's public image as an institution that
identified itself with the needs of citizens in the Common Market.84
The Parliament's powers increased with the adoption of the Single
European Act and the introduction of the so-called cooperation procedure.8 5
77. See infra note at 146 and accompanying text for an example of the Council's opposition to
provisions in a proposed consumer protection directive.
78. Trubek, supra note 1, at 22.
79. Member States may have legitimate reasons to resist further Community action. To the extent
that consumer interests are effectively protected by Member States, unduly active Community
institutions may do more harm than good. See, e.g., Chambraud et al., supra note 7, at 23, 35.
80. Bourgoignie, supra note 38, at 145.
81. The Council Directive on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, is
an example of a directive where Member State resistance against Commission proposals resulted in a
directive with generally vague language and a list of non-binding provisions. See infra note 141 and
accompanying text; see also AGENCE EUROPE, NO. 6865, at 14 (Dec. 23, 1996) (European consumers'
organization deploring that Member States have domestic measures to provide consumers access to
justice, but have been unable to agree in the Council on Community-wide measures).
82. KENDALL, supra note 76, at 14-15.
83. The Parliament lacked for a long time any significant influence in the decisionmaking
process. Its role was confined to a largely consultative position, whereas the Commission and the
Council were the two principal players in the decision making process. Id. at 15.
84. Bourgoignie, supra note 38, at 116-19 (The European Parliament stood for idea of the
"Common Market with a human face.").
85. KENDALL, supra note 76, at 15; see EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189c. Perhaps the most
important new aspects were Parliament's right to discuss proposed legislation twice, which includes an
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The TEU further strengthened Parliament's role with the introduction of the
so-called codecision procedure which was added to the existing
decisionmaking fi-amework. 6
Parliament still lacks the right of initiative, however. The exercise of its
veto right, moreover, depends on the approval of the veto by a majority of the
members of Parliament Thus, even though Parliament continues to call for
increased efforts related to consumer protection and for a single European
private law, it has only limited control over the legislation actually adopted.
iv) Consumer Organizations
Promoting ideas of stronger protection of consumer interests on the
Community level was also limited because no true "consumer entrepreneur,"
an organization representing solely consumer interests, existed at the
Community level. Consumer organizations exist and are active in a number of
Member States, but they do not have a similar degree of organizational
strength at the Community level. European consumer organizations therefore
traditionally played an insignificant role in the drafting of new legislation.
Commentators found that the lack of efficient organizations on the
Community level, underrepresentation within the Commission services and
the absence of formal participation rights in the decisionmaking process are
the main reasons for this phenomenon.87 Consumer interests were represented
primarily by Community institutions like the Commission. The Commission,
however, frequently must adopt compromise positions between conflicting
positions in the legislative process.
In 1989 the Commission reorganized its consumer consultative body into
the Consumer Consultative Council ("CCC") which improved the status
within the Commission's organizational structures and also resulted in a
broadening of functions. The CCC is supposed to advise the Commission on
consumer matters. Yet, despite this formal role within the Commission's
examination of proposals in Parliamentary committees, and the right to propose amendments. The
cooperation procedure does not allow, however, for full participation of Parliament or Parliament's
veto right. Parliament's amendments may be included in the Commission's next proposal, but there is
no obligation to do so. The Council may moreover change any of the Commission's amendments by a
unanimous vote. let
86. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189b. Under the codecision procedure Parliament may compel
the Council to enter into negotiations if the two institutions fail to agree on proposed legislation.
Parliament has an opportunity to veto proposed legislation if conciliation procedures fail.
87. See, e.g., KENDALL, .supra note 76, at 19; Bourgoignie, supra note 38, at 190-194; Trubek,
supra note 1, at4.
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preparatory procedures, the influence of consumer representatives in the
Community legislative process is still limited. They are hardly a "legislative
force" in the Community legislative process.8"
C. Instruments to Harmonize Member State Laws: Directives and Their
Effects on Consumer Protection in National Laws
1. The Nature and Effects of Directives
The Community's preeminent instrument to achieve greater uniformity
among existing Member State laws is the directive.89 This applies also to
consumer protection. Directives are like framework legislation directed
toward Member States. They provide specific results that Member States
have to achieve. The implementation of the directive's goals remains the
obligation of the Member States.9" Member States therefore have discretion to
decide how to ensure that a directive's provisions are effectively implemented
into their national legal orders. It is even possible that nothing need be done if
a Member State's existing legislation is already sufficient?'
Directives clearly are the most appropriate instrument for achieving a
minimum level of harmonization in an area with highly diverse existing
Member State law such as contract law or consumer protection law.
Directives are less intrusive than directly and generally applicable legislative
acts like regulations. At the same time, directives need not be comprehensive
because a directive's provisions will become effective within a Member
88. See, e.g., Goyens, supra note 24, at 77-79 (criticizing limited role of consumer interest
groups in Community legislative process). For a discussion on institutional consumer representation,
see Lothar Maier, Institutional Consumer Representation in the European Community, 16 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 355,362-73 (1993) (discussing the CCC's impact on legislative proposals).
89. The second legislative instruments with general application are regulations. Regulations are
similar to federal laws and become directly applicable in all Member States after their adoption by
Community institutions. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189(2).
90. Id art. 189(3).
91. This is subject to the requirement of legal certainty. Internal, nonbinding decrees issued by
administrative agencies, for example, are not sufficient to implement directives. Whether a long-
standing court practice might satisfy the legal certainty requirement is an open question, although there
is a strong argument that it should be sufficient.
With regard to the unfair contract terms directive, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, for example, several
Member States saw no need to amend their national laws. An example of a directive leaving the
Member States broad discretion is the Council Directive on package travel: It requires that organizers
and travel agents must provide security for the refund of money paid by the consumer and for
repatriation in the case of insolvency. 1990 O.1. (L 158) 59, art. 7. How the Member States ensure that
funds are available to cover the risk of insolvency is left to their discretion.
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State's existing legal system.92 Legislating by directives may also increase
consumer access to legal redress because it consolidates consumer protection
measures in Member State laws. National courts and general practitioners
familiar with national law are more likely to find and apply Community law
provisions that have been transformed into national law.93
Directives are not ideal in every respect, however. To become fully
effective, directives must be implemented by Member States. Member State
failure to timely implement directives has traditionally been an area of great
concern. In particular, nonimplementation undermines the goal of creating
equal conditions in those areas covered by a directive throughout the
Community.
2. Nonimplemented Directives and the Rights of Consumers
The Court developed peculiar rules designed to strengthen the position of
individuals vis-A-vis Member States that did not implement directives in time
and to hold those Member States responsible. In effect, nonimplemented
directives therefore have some effects in national legal systems and before
national courts. Several judgments involve consumer protection directives
that a Member State had failed to implement.94
The Court held that provisions of nontransposed directives can be
enforced against the Member State that failed to implement a directive in
time.9" No such effects exist, however, between two private individuals. In
other words, an individual cannot rely on provisions of a nonimplemented
directive in a law suit against another individual.96 National courts are under
92. One example is the Proposed Council Directive on Warranties and Guarantees, 1996 O.J. (C
307) 8. Instead of harmonizing all aspect of a consumer contract, including issues like formation or
unconscionability, the directive narrowly focusses on the scope of warranties and remedies. The other
aspects are left to national contract laws. See also infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
93. For similar considerations with respect to consumer protection and the UCC, see Jean
Braucher, Politics and Principle in the Drafting of UCC Consumer Protection Provisions, 29 UCC
L.J. 68 (1996) (favoring consolidating consumer protection in UCC which is most accessible to
lawyers in general practice).
94. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 & C-190/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany
(E.C.J. Oct. 8, 1996) (not yet reported), available at <http:lleuropa.eu.intlcj/en/act9626em.htm#C-
78/95> (visited on Oct. 23, 1996); Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl., 1994 E.C.R. I-
3325 (door-to-door sales directive).
95. In EC lingo, directives have "vertical direct effects." See, e.g., Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-
9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt,
1982 E.C.R. 53; Case C-41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337.
96. Directives have no "horizontal direct effects." See, e.g., Paolo Faccini Dori, 1994 E.C.R. I-
3325 (consumer suing seller of language course); Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southhampton & South-
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an obligation, however, to interpret their domestic laws in light of a
directive's provisions to achieve as much as possible the results envisaged in
the directive.97 Finally, if a Member State has failed to implement a directive
and an individual was riot able to enforce his or her rights against another
individual envisaged by the directive, the Member State may become liable
for damages resulting from its failure to act in time.9"
What follows is a brief example to explain how the above rules
concerning nonimplemented directives apply in connection with consumer
protection "directives. The example demonstrates that the limited effects of
nonimplemented directives are particularly significant in the case of
consumer protection directives. Enforcement in the "vertical relationship"
against the Member State usually is not useful for consumers in the case of
directives that concern, for example, contract rights or rights under tort law.
Without implementation, consumers cannot enforce their rights against sellers
or service providers. State liability to recover damages might not be an
attractive option, given the usually small claims involved in actions brought
by consumers.
The 1985 directive on door-to-door sales,99 for example, provides for the
consumer's right to cancel contracts covered by the directive within a period
of at least seven days. Also, the consumer must receive a written notice with
the information about the cancellation right' 0 Italy failed to implement the
directive in time. An Italian consumer agreed to buy a language course that
was offered to her at a train station. Within four days she attempted to cancel
Vest Hampshire Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723.
97. See, e.g., Case C-106/89, Mareleasing SA v. La Comercial Intemancional de Alimentaci6n
SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135; Case 14/83, von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984
E.C.R. 1891. The duty of interpreting national law in conformity with provisions of non-implemented
directives can of course go very far. It may have almost the same result as direct horizontal regulation.
In Mareleasing, for example, the Court held that provisions of Spanish law providing for the nullity of
a company established for a fraudulent purpose could not be applied because the relevant company law
directive which Spain had failed to implement included no such ground of nullity. The directive
therefore prevented the company's creditor from obtaining a judgment against the property of the
company's founder and owner. Thus, it had effects between two individuals. The Court has, however,
always maintained that there is a difference between the duty to interpret national law in light of a
directive's provisions and the concept of direct horizontal effects.
98. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-178/94, 179/94, 188/94 & 190/94, Dillenkofer (Oct. 8, 1996) (not
yet reported) (failure to implement directive is serious breach of Community law that triggers Member
State liability for damages suffered by individual).
99. Council Directive to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from
business premises, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 3 1.
100. Idarts.4-5.
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the contract, but the seller insisted on her payment, correctly arguing that
under Italian law their contract was valid and a cancellation did not exist. The
Court held that the consumer could not directly rely on the directive's
provisions to cancel the contract.'"' The Court emphasized the national
court's obligation to interpret national law in light of the directive's
provisions, ' 2 but it appears doubtful whether this remedy was helpful for the
consumer's cause. The consumer might, moreover, sue the Italian
Government for damages resulting from Italy's failure to implement the
directive, provided all conditions for state liability were met. 3
3. Effects of Directives on Harmonization and Enforcement
The use of directives to achieve greater harmonization among Member
State consumer protection laws has significant consequences for the
enforcement of consumer protection legislation. First, even with full
implementation, the harmonizing effects of Community legislation is limited.
National courts will apply implementing legislation in light of their
experience with domestic law which may result in diverse interpretation of
directive provisions. The more vague the language of the directive, the less
likely are harmonizing effects. It is unclear, for example, how much
uniformity will be achieved under the unfair contract term directive where
courts must interpret concepts like "unfairness" or "inappropriate" exclusion
of contract rights."*
The Treaty does in this respect confer the important task on the Court to
ensure a harmonized application of Community law. Pursuant to Article 177
of the EC Treaty, national courts may ask the Court for an interpretation of
101. Case C-91192, Paola Faccini Dori, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325 (lack of "horizontal direct effects").
102. Id
103. It was unclear in this case, however, whether there was the necessary causal link between the
Member State's failure to implement the directive and the consumer's damages. The directive may not
have covered the situation in which the parties entered into their contract. It is easier for consumers to
recover damages against a Member State Government under the facts of Joined Cases C-178/94,
179/94, 188/94 & 190/94, Dillenkofer (Oct. 8, 1996) (not yet reported). In this case Germany had
failed to correctly implement article 7 of the Directive on package travel, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59, which
requires Member States to ensure that travelers receive a refund of their payments in case of the tour
operator's or agent's bankruptcy. As a consequence, several Germans who did not receive their initial
down payment when their tour organizer went bankrupt sued the German government. The Court held
that in principle Germany was liable for damages.
104. See, e.g., Goyens, supra note 24, at 76 (interpretation by national authorities and courts in
light of their domestic experience may limit harmonization effects of Community legislation). See also
infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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Community law. °5 Article 177's importance for Community law in general
cannot be overestimated. Not only can it be an effective way of ensuring the
harmonized application of Community law in all Member States, but it
enables the Court in collaboration with national courts and individuals to
indirectly control Member State law for its conformity with Community
law.0 6 Whether it can effectively fulfill these functions in most actions
brought by consumers involving Community law questions is another matter,
given the additional time0 7 and litigation costs resulting from Article 177
reference procedures.'08
Another problem related with the enforcement of directives is the Member
State failure to correctly implement directive provisions that are designed to
confer individual rights on consumers. The instruments developed by the
Court to strengthen the position of the individual in the case of
nonimplementation may have only limited effects in the case of most
consumer protection directives.'0 9
Third, because directives become effective only through national
implementing legislation, only national courts and national agencies directly
enforce consumer protection laws. There is, for example, no Community
agency charged specifically with enforcing Community consumer protection
laws or receiving complaints from consumers. The Commission exercises
only indirect control by examining whether Member States implemented
directives correctly and in a timely manner."0 This situation reinforces the
105. If a national court finds that an answer is necessary to decide the case pending before it, it
may stay the national proceedings and refer a question concerning the interpretation or validity of
Community law to the Court. The Court decides only the Community law issues and the final decision
is rendered by the national court. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177. An Article 177 reference
question is almost the reverse situation to the case of Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y.
1995), where the federal court of appeals certified questions concerning New York state law to the
New York Court of Appeals. Under Community law, the national court "certifies" questions
concerning Community law to the "federal" court.
106. Article 177 reference questions have also enabled the Court to establish several fundamental
principles of Community law such as the supremacy and direct effect of Community law.
107. The average time Article 177 cases are pending before the Court is about 20 months.
108. It is perhaps significant that not a single reference question under Article 177 has been asked
with regard to the Product Liability Directive, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, which Member States had to
implement by 1988. Only three known cases involved consumer protection directives discussed in this
paper. (The Court decides over 200 cases per year, and more than 50% of those are based on Article
177.)
109. See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text.
110. The Commission receives complaints from consumers. See, e.g., Warranty Green Paper,
COM(93)322 final, annex VI (listing samples of consumer complaints brought before the
Commission). The Commission, however, has no enforcement powers with respect to consumer
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perception that consumer protection is a local task that is carried out on a
Member State level.
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION IN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
A. Introduction
The absence of an underlying, Community-wide harmonized law of
contracts or commercial law is perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Community's efforts to harmonize certain areas of consumer contract
rights."' There is certainly support in Europe for broader harmonization
efforts that would eventually create a single European contract law. In
particular, the European Parliament has endorsed the idea of a European civil
law code." 2 Private initiatives, moreover, to create a harmonized European
law of contract or commercial law have existed for several years."' The
Commission, however, recently affirmed that the Community's
harmonization efforts will focus on narrowly defined areas of contract law. In
the proposal for a harmonized system of warranties and guarantees in
consumer contracts, the Commission emphasized that legislation will not
affect other contract law issues such as formation and nonperformance." 4
The Community's consumer protection measures therefore cannot build
on a harmonized system of contract laws. Instead, diversity among Member
State contract laws and a nonuniform, although generally high level of
consumer protection, characterizes the European situation. This suggests that
"federal" legislative initiatives must focus on harmonization in narrowly
defined areas where positive effects on market integration are most likely to
protection laws.
I 11. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., European Parliament, Resolution Concerning the Harmonization of Certain Areas
of Member State Private Laws, 1994 O.J. (C 205) 18 (a follow-up resolution to the 1989 European
Parliament, Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member States, 1989 O.J.
(C 158) 400).
113. Most notable is the Commission on European Contract Law's project to draft a uniform
European contracts law code. Established in 1980, the Commission on European Contract Law,
sometimes called the "Lando Commission" after its chairman and one of the principal promoters, is a
private group of law professors from most Member States. Interestingly, the Commission relies also on
the UCC and the Restatements of Law as models for the future European Code, both for substantive
rules and the formal aspect of rules. As of 1996, the Commission has not published a final text.
114. Warranty Directive Proposal, COM(95)520 final at 7; see also the Commission Proposal for
a Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, COM(90)322 final, at 13 (time not ripe
for harmonization of law of obligations or sale of goods).
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be successful. Overly ambitious plans that require significant changes in
Member State contract laws are likely to fail, or result in unspecific measures
with little harmonizing effects on Member State contract laws, despite the
general consensus that consumer protection is a desirable goal." 5
This situation might explain why Community achievements appear less
remarkable in the area of consumer contracts. It might be the Community's
best strategy to narrowly focus on specific areas for harmonization and leave
the bulk of consumer protection measures to Member States because
consensus about advanced consumer protection measures may be easier to
achieve on a national level.16
To illustrate the difficulties the Community faces in its efforts to
harmonize contract laws in Europe, the following part discusses Community
legislative initiatives concerning consumer warranty rights. It will first discuss
the Community's 1993 unfair contract terms directive and argue that the
directive's ability to harmonize Member State laws and improve consumer
protection appears highly doubtful. Critical parts of the directive are
nonbinding and important provisions are not sufficiently specific. Ostensibly
the directive failed to overcome significant differences between national legal
systems. Member State resistance also prevented the inclusion of provisions
concerning consumer warranty rights in the directive.
The discussion then turns to the currently pending project to harmonize
consumer rights under Member State warranty laws. A lack of consensus has
already forced the Community to abandon the project's most ambitious
consumer protection goals such as direct producer liability for breach of
warranty. The currently pending legislation still includes elements concerning
consumer contract warranty rights. This part will also demonstrate certain
similarities between the proposed EC legislation and the discussion about
consumer protection within the UCC reform project.
115. See infra notes 139-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unfair contract term
directive's warranty related provisions, and infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text, for abandoned
plans to abolish the privity requirement for warranty claims.
116. See also Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1565, 1567-68 (1994) (quoting William Warren, UCCDrafiing: Method and Message,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 811, 812 (1993), and describing consumer protection in the United States as a
basically local task). See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text for an example of more advanced
Member State legislation regarding warranty rights. Several Member States have already adopted
legislation that provides for direct warranty claims against producers without requiring privity of
contract. The Community has at the moment not been able to reach consensus on this issue, but
national laws may at a later stage become the basis for Community harmonization legislation.
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B. Consumer Warranty Rights and Unfair Contract Terms
1. Community Programs and Member State Action
The first consumer policy program in 1975 already envisaged Community
legislation "to protect consumers against the abuse of the power of sellers, in
particular ... the unfair exclusion of essential rights in contracts."' 17
Obviously, a legislative project with this scope could have affected warranty
rights of consumers. The Commission soon thereafter initiated discussions
about a possible harmonization of unfair terms in consumer contracts. Around
the same time, however, a number of Member States adopted consumer
protection legislation on their own or considered reforms on a national level.
The Commission failed to find the necessary support among Member States.
It also lacked resources to proceed with a proposal for a directive." 8
As Member States went ahead with individual legislation to protect
economic interests of consumers, differences between national laws
increased. A brief example illustrates the variations between warranty-related
consumer protection provisions that three Member States adopted around the
time when the Commission for the first time considered Community action.
Differences appear significant in particular with regard to formal and
procedural aspects." 9 In substance, differences may have been less important,
although no empirical data are available that analyzed and compared
decisions of national courts in this area. 2 '
117. 19750.J.(C92)1.
118. See Communication from the Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts Concluded with
Consumers, COM(84)55 final at 12. The developments in the 1970s are a good example of the
legislative process under the Community's "Realverfassung." The Commission in principle has the
monopoly of drafting and proposing legislation. The Member States' role would be limited to
approving legislation in the Council. In reality, however, Member State influence exists at a much
earlier stage because the Commission consults with Member State representatives during the drafting
process. The Community's legislative agenda therefore frequently reflects Member State interests.
119. In the 1990 proposal of the unfair contract term directive, for example, the Commission
observed considerable variations among Member State laws with respect to unfair contract terms.
COM(90)322 final at 12.
120. A large scale, Commission-sponsored project to study consumer legislation in EC Member
States resulted in a comparative study in 1981. The study focussed, however, on the evaluation of
legislative activity and administrative implementation and largely excluded case-law analysis. See
NORBERT REICH & HANS-W. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COuNT~iEs (1980).
The 1993 Commission Warranty Green Paper's survey of Member State laws reveals significant
similarities in several substantive aspects of warranty law. See COM(93)509 final at 22-23 (most
Member States introduced mandatory provisions in favor of consumers); id. at 28-29 (definition of
defect in most Member States based on notion of fitness for ordinary use envisaged in the contract); id.
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In Germany, the civil code's warranty provisions require a seller to
provide products free of defects that diminish the products' value or their
capacity for normal use or use as provided in the contract. The 1976 Standard
Contract Terms Act'2 1 which applies to all standard contracts without
distinction between consumer contracts and contracts between merchants
declares exclusions of warranty claims invalid. Only in certain circumstances
may the general contract terms limit the buyer's rights to the right to have the
products repaired or replaced.
22
France has more recently relied on the administrative law provisions of the
1978 Law on the Protection and Information of Consumers of Products and
Services"n to protect consumers against unfair contract terms. The law
authorized the Council of State to define contract terms that are considered
unfair and prohibited in consumer contracts.' Terms that conflict with the
Council's list are unenforceable. A Council of State Decree implementing the
Act provides that clauses limiting the liability of a seller who fails to fulfill its
obligations are unenforceable." In addition, French case law has achieved an
almost identical result under Civil Code provisions. Article 1641 Code Civil
makes the seller liable for any latent defects that make the product unsuitable
for the intended use or reduce the product's value to the buyer. French courts
have established that the seller cannot exclude the liability for latent defects in
consumer contracts.
126
No civil law code exists in the United Kingdom. Instead, several statutes
deal with specific aspects of contract law. 127 The 1979 Sale of Goods Act
at 39 (right to demand repudiation of contract or reduction in price exists in all Member States,
although rights of having product repaired or replaced exists only in about half of the Member States);
id. at 42 (significant differences with respect to warranty periods).
121. Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen GeschAftsbedingungen (AGB Gesetz)
(Dec. 9, 1976) (BGBI. 13317).
122. Id § 11, 10(a), (b). The Act also includes a general prohibition of standard contract terms
that place one party at such a disadvantage that is incompatible with the requirements of good faith. Id.
§ 9(1).
123. Loi sur la protection et l'information des consummmateurs de produits et de services, Act
No. 78-23 (Fr. Jan. 10, 1978).
124. Id arts. 35-38. The Council's decisions are mandatory only with respect to consumer
contracts.
125. Decree 78-464 art. 2 (Fr. Mar. 24, 1978).
126. C. CIv. art. 1643 (Fr.) in principle allows the exclusion of the seller's liability for latent
defects, but the courts have held that such exclusion is valid only in contracts between merchants
specialized in the same field.
127. E.g., Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act, 1973 (Eng.); Sale of Goods and Services Act,
1982 (Eng.) Sale of Goods Act, 1979 (Eng.).
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provided that goods bought from a business seller must be of merchantable
quality, must be fit for the intended purpose where the seller was aware that
reliance was placed on its skill and judgment, and must comply with the
seller's description. The merchantable quality standard was replaced by a
satisfactory quality standard by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act of 1994.128
The 1977 Unfair Contract Terms Act provides that contract terms that reduce
the effect of statutory implied terms in contracts are per se invalid in
consumer contracts. 129
These different systems to ensure consumer protection support the
argument that even a reasonably well-informed consumer will hardly
understand her contract rights in a cross-border transaction. Creating a
Community-wide set of minimum rights might therefore be at least a first step
toward making the benefits of a single market readily accessible for
consumers. The differences also illustrate some of the difficulties in the
Community's harmonization efforts.
2. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive
a. The Commission's First Proposal
A first concrete step toward (partial) harmonization of consumer rights
under Member State warranty laws occurred within the framework of the
1993 unfair contract terms directive. 131 The first Commission proposal,
published in 1990,131 consisted of a short operative text with a very general
definition of "unfairness" and an annex with a binding13 1 list of unfair terms.
Unfair contract terms had to be unenforceable in Member State contract
laws.
33
Contract terms in consumer contracts were considered unfair if they
caused a significant imbalance in the parties' rights, made the contract's
128. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, § 14(b) (Eng.), as amended, Sale and Supply of Goods Act, 1994,
§ 1(1) (Eng.).
129. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, § 6 (Eng.). The Act otherwise provides that liability can be
excluded in contracts, with the exception of liability for death or personal injury, provided such
exclusion is reasonable.
130. Council Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.
131. Proposal for a Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1992 O.L (C 243) 2.
132. The binding character of the annex was not explicit. The preamble suggested, however, that a
binding annex was "desirable to identify certain types of terms which must not be used in contracts
concluded with consumers."
133. Id. at 3,art. 3.
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performance unduly detrimental to the consumer or significantly different
from what the consumer could expect or were incompatible with good faith
principles.'34 The proposed list of unfair contract terms included clauses that
denied consumers the right to obtain goods in conformity with the contract
and fit for the purpose for which they were sold.'35 The annex also black-
listed contract terms that prevented consumers from relying on certain
remedies if the seller breached warranty obligations.'36
The European Parliament strongly supported the Commission's proposal
and even suggested expanding the scope of consumer protection measures.
Responses by Member States and commentators, however, were less
enthusiastic. Member States apparently were not prepared at that time to
accept far-reaching changes in their national contract laws. Their reaction was
not surprising given the very complex task of harmonizing twelve Member
State laws governing unfair contract terms and the relatively poor quality of
the Conunission's first proposal.'37 The following three-year legislative
process resulted in significant changes to the directive, including the
warranty-related provisions. 3 In terms of harmonizing Member State laws,
the final results were hardly encouraging.
b. The Directive's Warranty-Related Provisions
The directive's final text was adopted in 1993 and became effective on
January 1, 1995." 9 The directive defines the notion of "unfair contract terms"
as nonnegotiated contract terms that cause a significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer. Member
134. Id art.2.
135. Id at4, annex (c).
136. Id The proposal further envisaged that sellers could not exclude their liability for any damage
caused by nonperformance. Id. annex(e).
137. See, e.g., Hans Erich Brandner & Peter Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair
Consumer Contracts: Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission, 28
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647 (1991); see also infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (criticizing
use of vague language to define unlawful contract terms and criticizing ambiguities about scope of
directive).
138. One commentator observed an increasing "Germanization" of the directive because it became
increasingly similar to the German Standard Contract Terms Act, supra note 121, the "most
sophisticated" consumer protection law. See Peter Ulmer, Zur Anpassung das AGB-Gesetzes and die
EG-Richilinie fiber mifbrduchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertrdgen, 4 EURoPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 337 (1993). Other changes included, for example, a reduced scope of
application as the directive applies only to contract terms in pre-formulated contracts and not to
individually negotiated contract terms. See 1992 O.J. (C 243) at 3, art. 3.
139. 1993 OJ. (L 95) 29,32, art. 10.
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States must ensure that preformulated unfair contract terms in consumer
contracts are unenforceable. 4 ' The annex includes a list of unfair contract
terms, including a scaled-down warranty-related provision. According to
paragraph l(b), a contract term is unfair if it inappropriately excludes or limits
the consumer's rights vis-h-vis sellers in the case of nonperformance or
inadequate performance.
The lack of specific language in key provisions raises doubts as to whether
the directive is an effective consumer protection instrument. This applies in
particular to the warranty related provision.
i) Nonbinding List of Unfair Terms
The first significant change to the Commission's initial proposal occurred
when the Council suggested that the list of unfair clauses in the directive's
annex be nonbinding and include only examples of unfair clauses. Over the
Parliament's opposition and insistence on a mandatory list,'.' the
Commission ultimately accepted the Member States' position. In the final
version, the annex's list of unfair terms is merely indicative. 42 The directive
does not oblige Member States to adopt the entire list into their national laws.
For that reason alone, its actual harmonizing effects appear questionable.'43
ii) Mandatory Contract Terms Without Harmonization of Warranty
Rights
Perhaps even more significantly, the directive prohibits only the exclusion
of certain consumer contract rights and fails to ensure that consumers have
the same minimum rights in all Member States in the first place. Interestingly,
the Commission appears to have realized that merely prohibiting the
exclusion of warranty rights had insufficient harmonizing effects so long as
minimum warranty rights themselves were not harmonized. The
Commission's 1992 amended proposal included a provision that defined
minimum warranty rights in the directive's main text. Article 6(1) provided
for the consumer's right to receive goods "in conformity with the contract and
140. Id at 31, art. 3 (defining unfair contract term); id. art. 6 (requiring unenforceability).
141. See SECOND REPORT CONCERNING THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON
UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS, No. A3-0295/91, at 7 (1994) [hereinafter HOON REPORT].
142. 1993 O.J. (L 95) at 31, art. 3.
143. See, e.g., European Parliament, Second Report, A3-0409/92, at 6 (Dec. 4, 1992) (stating that
definition of annex as indicative list undermines directive's harmonization goal).
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fit for the purpose for which they were sold."'" In the case of breach of
warranty, the consumer's remedies had to include the right to chose between
reimbursement, replacement, price reduction, and repair.'45
Member States, however, rejected the proposed inclusion of positive
warranty rights. Presumably, it would have required significant changes in
several Member State laws. The fact that the proposed provision was not the
result of an in-depth study of the problem arguably contributed to the
opposition of the positive warranty rights. 4
6
The directive's final concept of making certain terms in consumer
contracts mandatory may be a useful step to ensure greater consumer
protection. 47 Whether it will be sufficient to achieve the directive's declared
goal of increasing consumer confidence in the Common Market is another
question. The diversity of substantive provisions in national contract laws
within the Community will most likely continue to inhibit enforcement of
consumer rights in cross border transactions.'48
iii) Vague Language in the List of Prohibited Contract Terms
The initial proposal's list of provisions concerning unfair terms was
criticized in particular because the list included too many general terms which
would have largely defeated the annex's purpose.'49 This criticism still
applies. Several of the annex's provisions consider contract terms that
exclude consumer rights unfair only if they are "inappropriate."
144. Commission documents failed to provide an explanation for the rather cursory definition of
the scope of warranties.
145. See Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts,
COM(92)66 final. The Commission somehow misleadingly labelled the amendment a "clarification"
of the first proposal. Id. at 3.
146. The Council reasoned that the issue of guaranteed harmonization required more careful
consideration and invited the Commission to examine opportunities for future harmonization schemes.
Council Statement in Connection with the Adoption of the Directive on Unfair Terms of Apr. 8, 1992,
cited in Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)509 final at 12.
147. Member States took this first step long before the Community, see supra notes 121-29 and
accompanying text. Mandatory provisions may also achieve greater market efficiency. On market
failures based on consumers' informational deficits and high enforcement costs, see Braucher, supra
note 93, at 75-76.
148. Another area outside the directive's application are oral modifications of contract terms. If
consumer warranty rights are orally excluded, the directive does not apply because the exclusion is not
based on a preformulated contract term. National laws will most likely place limits on the seller's
ability to rely on oral exclusions of consumer rights. The directive, however, will have no harmonizing
effects in this case.
149. Brandner & Ulmer, supra note 137, at 659-60.
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The "inappropriateness" standard will force national courts to consider all
circumstances to decide the lawfulness of a contract term. A national court
may conclude that excluding certain warranty-related rights in consumer
contracts is justified in certain circumstances. Limiting the scope of the
warranty, for example, or excluding the warranty of merchantability may not
always appear "inappropriate." A fuzzy concept like the "inappropriate"
exclusion of rights tends to undermine the benefits of a codified list of terms
considered to be unfair to consumers, 5 ° although commentators in the United
States have suggested that ambiguities in statutory language might actually
help consumers in court.'
iv) Scope of Warranty v. Remedies for Breach of Warranty
The extent of the prohibition from excluding consumer contract rights is
also unclear." 2 A strictly textual interpretation suggests that the annex
prohibits as unfair only those contract terms that exclude certain remedies in
the case of breach of warranty, but not the seller's disclaimers or
modifications of warranties. 5 3
The directive's legislative history, however, might support the
interpretation that paragraph l(b) of the annex covers both disclaimers of
warranties and exclusions of remedies.5 4 This ambiguity might prevent a
uniform implementation of the provision in Member State contract laws.
150. Id at 660 ("vague concepts ... should be avoided" to define unfhimess); Braucher, supra note 93,
at 78.
The Directive adds another element of uncertainty by stating that contract terms be regarded unfair
only if they are contrary to the requirement of good faith. Council Directive, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, art.
3. A warranty disclaimer would therefore fall outside the directive's prohibition of unfair contract
terms ifa court considers that the disclaimer is not against good faith.
151. See JAMES J. WHITE& ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-3 to 4-8, at
210-36 (4th ed. 1995) (arguing that uncertainty created by ambiguous terms in the Code has permitted
activist courts to reach decisions favorable to consumers).
152. See 1993 O.J. (L 95) at 33, annex (1)(b).
153. Annex(l)(b) refers only to rights in the event of non-performance or inadequate performance
(comparable to U.C.C. § 2-719 (1995)), and does not address a modification or exclusion of warranties
(and has therefore not the same function as U.C.C. § 2-316 (1995)). A seller might therefore avoid the
problematic area of excluding remedies by narrowly defining the scope of warranties.
154. It is arguable that Annex(1)(b) has replaced Article 6 of the Commission's second proposal.
Commission Amended Proposal, 1992 O.J. (C 73) 7. Article 6 prohibited the limitation of warranties
and exclusion of remedies.
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v) Plain and Intelligible Language Requirements
Criticism of the Commission's initial proposal was directed in particular at
the definition of "unfair terms." The proposed unfairness test in Article 2(1)
was so broad that it appeared to include contractual provisions that defined
the parties' principal duties. This provision would have required courts, under
the notion of unfair contract terms, to inquire into the adequacy of
consideration."'
The directive's final text addresses this problem. It fails, however, to
entirely avoid the ambiguities in the initial proposal. Article 3(3) still
incorporates the controversial language of the first draft which appeared to
apply the unfairness test to the consideration of a contract.'56 Article 4(2)
provides, however, that the notion of unfairness shall not refer to the
definition of the subject matter or the adequacy of the price, provided these
terms are in plain, intelligible language.
Although Article 4(2) indicates that the notion of unfairness is not
concerned with the parties' main duties, the relationship between Articles
3(3) and 4(2) and their effects on warranty-related contract terms remains
somehow unclear. If a disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability, for
example, is considered part of the definition of the seller's main obligation
towards the consumer, it would fall outside the scope of the directive pursuant
to Article 4(2). A consumer, however, might benefit from the plain and
intelligible language requirement in Article 4(2). She might argue that a
contract term which does not clearly distinguish between a description of the
product and the limitation of the purchaser's warranty-related rights fails to
meet Article 4(2)'s clear language requirement. In this case the unclear term
arguably would be subject to Article 3(l)'s unfairness review.'57 Ambiguities
created by these two provisions will not facilitate enforcement of consumer
protection laws. 58
155. Commission Proposal, 1990 O.J. (C 243) 2, 3, art. 2 (contract terms considered unfair if they
caused significant imbalance in the parties' rights); see also, Bmndner & Ulmer, supra note 137, at
655.
156. 1993 O.3. (L 95) at 31, art. 3 (contract term considered unfair if it causes "significant
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the
consumer").
157. Article 4(2) is a specific application of the general plain and intelligible requirement
incorporated in Article 5. Article 5 adds as a rule of interpretation that ambiguous terms be interpreted
in favor of the consumer. Id arts. 4, 5.
158. Consumer protection provisions should be as specific as possible to increase voluntary
compliance by sellers and make enforcement of consumer rights more feasible. See Braucher, supra
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c. Conclusions
For several reasons one wonders whether the directive will achieve its
declared goals of increasing consumer confidence in transactions outside their
Member State and of encouraging consumers to use the advantages offered in
a single market. Certainly with regard to warranty-related rights the
directive's harmonizing effects are negligible, given the directive's vague
language, the absence of a definition of minimum warranty rights in
consumer contracts and the nonbinding nature of the provisions in the annex.
That several of the directive's provisions fail to meet the directive's own plain
and intelligible language requirements is a reason for additional concern.
3. The Proposed Directive on Warranties and Guarantees
The unfair contract terms directive's limited effect on warranties in
consumer contracts highlighted the need for continued Community efforts.159
In 1993, the Commission published a discussion paper related to
warranties,"6 guarantees, and after-sale services in consumer contracts.'6 ' The
Warranty Green Paper's comprehensive scope had suggested that Community
action in all three areas might be forthcoming. An earlier, intemally circulated
draft had an equally ambitious scope. 62 The 1996 proposal for a directive on
warranties,'63 however, is a scaled-down version which narrowly focuses on
warranties, only marginally affects commercial guarantees, and does not
note 93, at 78-79; Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consuners-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2 Revision
Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1593, 1599 (1994).
159. Harmonizing consumer rights under Member State warranty laws has been on the
Community agenda since the early 1980s. The second EC Consumer Protection Program, Council
Resolution, 1981 O.J. (C 133) 1, for example, called for proposals to improve the conditions of
warranty on the part of the supplier and/or producer. See also Council Resolution on Future Priorities
for Relaunching Consumer Protection Policy, 1989 O.J. (C 294) 1; Communication from the
Commission, A New Impetus for Consumer Protection Policy, COM(85)314 final (referring to
warranty related problems in particular in cross border purchase situations).
160. The Commission documents almost invariably refer to "legal guarantee" and do not use the
synonymous term warranty. In the framework of this Symposium, however, it appears appropriate to
continue to use the term warranty.
161. Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)509 final.
162. Vorschlag fir eine Richtlinie des Europllischen Parlaments und des Rates tiber den
Verbrauchsgoterkauf, Garantien und Kundendienst [Proposal of October 1995] (unpublished, on file
with the author) [hereinafter Internal Draft]. In addition to provisions covering commercial guarantees
and after-the-sale services, the Internal Draft envisaged a warranty-like liability of the producer. See
supra note 191 and accompanying text.
163. 1996 O.J. (C 307) 8.
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mention after-sale services."6
The proposed directive's features include a definition of the scope of
warranties. The statute of limitation ends two years after the product has been
delivered to the consumer. The buyer's remedies in the case of breach of
warranty include repair and replacement of the good, price reduction, and
rescission of the contract. To preserve her remedies, the consumer must notify
the seller within one month after the defect becomes apparent. The
consumer's warranty rights are nonwaivable. Concerning commercial
guarantees, the proposed directive provides for a writing requirement and
requires that the consumer's rights under the commercial guarantee exceed
her warranty rights.
a. Beneficiaries
Language in the current proposal suggests that the directive may actually
not be limited to consumer contracts. Article 2(1), for example, requires that
"consumer goods" be in conformity with the contract. "Consumer goods" are
defined as all goods that are normally intended for final use or
consumption."6 Goods which are purchased for final consumption by a
merchant or business person would also fall under this definition. This
solution apparently would be favored by the Commission.'66
Several other provisions, however, define the scope of the directive by the
purchaser's capacity as a consumer. They refer, for example, to the rights of
consumers, representations made to the consumer, and delivery to consumers.
164. The necessary consensus, including acceptance by business representatives that reform might
be justified, apparently emerged only in the area of warranties. See Internal Draft, supra note 162, at x
(indicating that business support existed only for a harmonization of warranties). Interestingly, there
are certain parallels to the UCC reform debate. Reportedly, the law of warranties is an area where
broad consensus exist about the need for specific consumer protection amendments. See Miller, supra
note 116, at 1574 n.36.
165. 1996 O.J. (C 307) 8, art. 1.
166. See also Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)509 final at 83-84 (demonstrating Commission's
preference for an objective criterion to define the directive's scope of application which is independent
purchaser's capacity as private person).
The best argument in favor of a broad scope of application is related to the proposed directive's
claim that differences between Member State warranty laws distort competition between sellers in
Member States and require Community harmonization measures. See id preamble. It would be
inconsistent with that claim if the proposed directive applied only to consumer contracts and not to
contracts between merchants. To eliminate distortion of competition, contracts between merchants
arguably must be equally harmonized. The proposed directive moreover is not based on EC Article
129a, the Treaty's consumer protection Article, but on EC Article 100a, the basis for general
legislation in connection with the EC's market integration project.
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The directive's characterization as a consumer protection measure suggests
the same conclusion. Expanding the directive's scope to all contracts for the
purchase of "consumer products" would also be at odds with the directive's
rationale that consumers need special protection as they are traditionally the
weaker parties to a contract.
It appears therefore that the directive will in effect protect only
"consumers" as purchasers. 67 Expanding the directive's scope beyond the
goal of protecting consumers would result in an unnecessary interference with
the freedom of contract where both parties act in the course of business.'68
Ambiguities in several provisions make it difficult, however, to find a
conclusive answer. 69
b. The Directive's Warranty Provisions
i) Scope of Warranties
Article 2's definition of the scope of warranty is drafted after Article 35(1)
and 35(2) of the UN Sales Convention. 7  Article 2(1) first states the obvious
by requiring that products must be in conformity with the contract. Article
2(2) specifies four criteria to determine contract conformity. The first three
are almost identical with Article 35(2) of the UN Sales Convention.'71
Products must be in conformity with express warranties, based on the seller's
description or samples and models.'72 They must be fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such products are normally used.' Products must
167. "Consumer" is a person who acts outside the course of business. 1996 O.J. (C 307) 8, art. 1.
168. The focus on consumer protection provides also the response to a hypothetical question that
the Commission raised in the Warranty Green Paper. As an argument against limiting the directive's
scope to purchasers acting outside the course of business (i.e. consumers), the Commission asks why a
person buying a car should be subject to different rules, depending on whether she purchases the car
for private or business purposes. Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)322 final at 84. The obvious
response is that protective measures that interfere with the parties' freedom to contract should be the
exception rather than the rule. Such measures typically are not justified where the buyer acts in the
course of business.
169. Compare 1996 O.J. (C 307) 8, art. 2(l) (using the term consumer goods), with id. art. 3(2)
(scope of warranties), and id. art. 3(4). (referring to "consumers").
170. Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.97/19 (1981) (Official English version reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264
(1987)).
171. They therefore are also similar to the UCC definitions of the scope of warranties. See U.C.C.
§§ 2-313,2-314,2-315 (1995).
172. 1996 O.J. (C 307) 8, art. 2(2)(a).
173. Il art. 2(2)(b).
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moreover be fit for a particular purpose for which the consumer acquired the
products, provided the consumer disclosed such purpose to the seller, unless it
is evident from the circumstances that the purchaser did not rely on the
seller's statements. 74
The fourth point raises more interesting questions. Article 2(2)(d) requires
that products be satisfactory, considering their quality, the price, and
representations by the seller and producer. This provision is perhaps best
understood in light of the Warranty Green Paper's discussion of Member
State laws. The "satisfactory quality" standard was part of a suggested
amendment to the U.K. 1979 Sales of Goods Act.'75 There, the proposed
definition of "satisfactory quality" referred to standards that a reasonable
person would regard as satisfactory, considering the products' description and
price and other relevant circumstances. The reference to a "satisfactory
quality" was designed in particular to include notions like appearance and
finish and safety and durability in the definition of conformity with the
contract. 76
The Commission in the Warranty Green Paper suggested to use a
consumer expectation test to define the scope of warranties which appeared to
be very similar to the satisfactory quality test in the Department of Trade and
Industry ("DTI") Consultation Document. To define the notion of legitimate
consumer expectation, the Commission offered a laundry list of factors
including the product presentation, the price and brand, and the nature and
purpose of the product.'77
The consumer expectation test does not appear as an independent factor in
the Commission's official proposal.'78 This certainly is an improvement over
the Commission's initial suggestion. A reference to all possible circumstances
that may influence a consumer's expectations about the product would have
174. Id art. 2(2)(c).
175. In 1994, the United Kingdom adopted the Sale and Supply of Goods Act, 1994, which
introduced the satisfactory quality standard into English law.
176. See Dep't of Trade and Industry, Consumer Guarantees, A Consultation Document 4 (Feb.
1992) [hereinafter DTI Consultation Document], reprinted in Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)509
(Annex V).
177. Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)309 final at 85-86. Compare DTI Consultation Document,
supra note 176, art. 18, draft amendment to sec. 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
178. Despite the Commission's apparent assurances that a "legitimate expectation test" would not
be a remarkable development-and broad support from consumer representatives, see, e.g., European
Consumer Law Group, The EU Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and 4fier-Sale
Services-A Response, 17 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 363, 364 (1994), opposition from industry apparently
was strong enough to cause the Commission to reconsider its initial proposal.
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been so vague that it probably would have done little to effectively improve
consumer protection. 79
Article 2(2)(d) now uses a satisfactory quality and performance standard
to define the scope of warranties. Assuming that the DTI Consultation
Document is the source of Article 2(2)(d), product durability, together with
the product's safety, appearance and finish, arguably are criteria to determine
whether a product is in conformity with the contract under the proposed
directive.
Article 2(2)(d) is also interesting because the producer's statements
concerning the product's quality or performance are included in the test of a
product's conformity with the contract. Although the producer's public
statements cannot make the producer directly liable for a breach of express
warranties, they may under certain circumstances result in the seller's liability
for breach of warranty. Article 3(2) essentially provides that the seller will be
liable if products fail to conform with the producer's statements, unless the
seller demonstrates that the producer's statements did not become part of the
bargain between the seller and the consumer.' °
Article 3(2) indicates that any producer's statement that "influenced" the
consumer's purchasing decision may trigger the seller's warranty liability.
The influence standard may be overly broad. Although the directive is silent
on this issue, one probably must assume that statements expressing only the
producer's subjective opinion or commendation of a product do not create a
warranty. Presumably, warranty liability will arise only when the consumer's
reliance on the producer's public statements was reasonable. The directive
does not specify which party bears the burden of proof to demonstrate
179. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the limited effects of
vague statutory terms on the level of consumer protection. Interestingly, the 1992 DTI Consultation
Document, supra note 176, did raise the question about economic effects of a vague satisfactory
quality standard to define the scope of warranties. Id at 6 (expressing concerns about increased costs,
in particular increased litigation costs, which would ultimately raise prices of products, making
positive effects on consumer confidence doubtful). Similar considerations are notably absent in
Commission documents.
180. Pursuant to Article 3(2), liability will arise if the seller cannot demonstrate that he did not
know and could not have known the producer's statements, that he corrected the producer's statements
at the time of the purchase, or that the purchasing decision was not influenced by the producer's
statements. To the extent that public statements that the seller should have known about become part
of the seller's agreement with the purchaser, Article 3(2) goes somewhat beyond the part-of-the-
bargain concept. Article 3(2)'s requirements limit the seller's indirect liability for express warranties
to cases where the consumer relied on the producer's public statements. See infra note 202.
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whether the seller's public statement was puffery or an affirmation of the
product's quality.
ii) Breach of Warranty versus Product Defectiveness
It is interesting how little attention the relationship between warranty
liability under the proposed warranty directive and liability in tort for
defective products received during the preparation of the proposed warranty
directive. This appears remarkable, considering that a Community-wide
harmonized system of strict liability in tort for damages caused by defective
products has existed since 1985"8' and that the Commission initially
considered imposing a warranty liability on the producer towards remote
buyers.
There are of course reasons that explain at least in part the lack of any
significant interest in this issue. Perhaps the most important reason is the
modest level of product liability litigation in the Community during the past
ten years. 82 But there are also substantive explanations. First, different
persons are potentially liable for damages. As a consequence of the narrower
scope of the officially proposed warranty directive, consumers would have a
claim for breach of warranty only against their immediate sellers. Product
liability claims, on the other hand, are directed primarily against the
manufacturer of defective products.'83 Second, the proposed warranty
directive regulates only economic loss in the narrow sense of damages for
loss of the bargain. The product liability directive, on the other hand,
expressly excludes damages to the defective product from the scope of the
directive and covers only cases of personal injury and damages to property,
181. Product Liability Directive, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29. Article 1 provides for the producer's
liability for defective products. Article 4 requires only that the injured person prove the damage,
defect, and causal connection, without referring to the producer's fault.
182. whereas the pace of American products liability litigation during the first quarter century has
been described as "fast and furious," see James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 4024 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1528
(1992), the pace of European products liability litigation following the 1985 products liability directive
was anemic. The Commission's "10th anniversary report," for example, summarizes the developments
in all Member States on one page stating that neither the number of tort actions nor insurance
premiums increased and that things will change only very slowly. See First Report concerning the
application of Council Directive on the approximation of laws, 'regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, COM(95)617 final at 2.
183. 1985 O.J. (L 210), art. 1. Exceptions exist because liability is extended to the importer, id.
art. 3(2), and, as far as producer and importer of a defective product into the Community cannot be
identified, to the supplier of a defective product, id art. 3(3).
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not including the defective product. 84 The liability system created by the two
directives therefore avoids any significant overlap and requires a consumer to
bring an action against either the seller or the producer, or both, depending on
the type of damage that she has suffered.
Questions concerning the relationship of the two forms of liability may
nevertheless arise, in particular concerning the potential (direct or indirect)
liability of producers based on their public statements.'85 One can ask, for
example, whether liability for the breach of warranty that results from the
producer's presentation of its products automatically means that the producer
is potentially liable in tort because the products are defective. A first analysis
suggests that in this case the notion of a defective product in tort actions and
the concept of breach of warranty in contract actions are largely similar, if not
identical."' This conclusion is based largely on the Product Liability
Directive's definition of a defective product in connection with strict liability
in tort. Article 6 provides that a product is defective if it does not provide the
safety that a person is entitled to expect. The directive lists among the factors
184. Id. art. 9. In both cases, the issue of liability for consequential damages is left to Member State
laws.
185. If a seller is found liable for warranty-related claims as a consequence of the producer's
public statements, for example, a plaintiff consumer might attempt to use the findings of the first court
as evidence in a product liability suit against the producer. Also, a producer might be joined as a third
party defendant by a seller who is sued in a breach of warranty action. The seller may in certain cases
be the defendant at the same time in a product liability suit, if, for example, he manufactured and
directly sold to consumers allegedly defective products.
186. This statement is limited to the specific situation in the Community and applies only to cases
where liability results from the producer's public statements. It does not express a position concerning
the highly controversial issue of the relationship between warranty liability and tort liability in the
United States. As explained in the text, the liability standards for tort liability and warranty liability
overlap under Community law because both systems use a consumer expectation test. The identical
standard of liability means a fairly broad scope of liability in tort and contract. The situation is
markedly different in the United States where the notion of a defect in product liability cases is to a
much greater extent based on a risk/utility test. Creating a common standard by extending the
risk/utility standard into the field of warranty liability to replace the currently prevailing consumer
expectation standard, as suggested by the drafters of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995), would significantly narrow the scope of
warranty liability. For a discussion of the U.S. issues, see Jay M. Feinman, Implied Warranty,
Products Liability, and the Boundary Between Contract and Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469 (1997).
Yet, whatever liability standard applies, there is a strong argument that at least in a case where
liability is based on the producer's public statements, liability in tort resulting from defective products
and liability in contract resulting from breach of warranty should be the same. This is contrary to the
result reached by the court in Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995). If, for example,
the producer's public statements induce consumers to use a product in a specific way, even though the
product is not safe for such use, the product does not meet legitimate consumer expectations and is
unsafe.
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to determine whether a product was safe the presentation of the product and
the use of the product which could be reasonably expected.' 7
The product liability directive therefore specifically relies on the justified
user expectations (or objective consumer expectations) to determine a
product's defectiveness. This test refers to objectively justified expectations
and does not include the injured persons's subjective expectations. There is
nevertheless a strong argument that reasonable expectations of the public,
including consumers, must be given greater weight than the producer's
considerations of the product's safety.' The product liability directive
apparently rejected a risk/utility test to determine whether a product was
defective, at least as a principal method.8 9
The important point is that under the product liability directive the
manufacturer's public statements supposedly play an important role for the
definition of the defectiveness of a product, provided they create reasonable
expectations concerning the functioning of the product. Along the same lines,
the proposed warranty directive requires the producer's statements about the
quality of a product to help determine the scope of a warranty. 90 In both areas
the reasonable consumer expectations therefore play a decisive role to
determine liability.
That the Community has during the past ten years not been able to define
more precisely the scope of the notion of a "defective product" is significant
and a reason for concern. Two explanations for the lack of any significant
187. 1985 O.J. (L 210) art 6(1)(a)-(b). Article 6(1)(c) also mentions the time when the product was
put into circulation.
188. This has been a controversial issue in the past. Unfortunately, the debate was limited to
statements in the legal literature. The Court of Justice has not yet interpreted provisions of the product
liability directive. Commentators have disagreed, for example, whether the general public's
expectations or the average user's expectations determine whether a product was safe.
189. The producer's expectations are relevant primarily to determine whether the product's use
was reasonable and not to determine whether the product was defective. The Article 6 factors are not
exhaustive, however, so that a court also might include risk versus utility considerations in its
determination of whether a product was defective.
Some commentators in Europe have criticized the directive's notion of a defect and argued that
the Community failed to use the experience in the United States to define a workable test of a
product's defectiveness. They expressed concern in particular that the consumer expectations test is so
open-ended and unstructured that the development of a harmonized, Community-wide test to
determine a products safety is unlikely. See, e.g., Hermann Hollmann, Die EG-
Produkthaftungsrichtlinie (1), 38 DER BETRIEB 2389, 2392 (1985). Others appear to assume that the
producer's views are equally important to determine whether a product is defective. See, e.g.,
PRODUCT LIABILITY EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE 52-55 (Christopher J.S. Hodges ed., 1993).
190. Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)509 final at 86 (concluding that the definitions of a
product's defectiveness and the scope of warranty are very similar).
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development toward greater harmonization in this area are possible: Either the
issue of a product's defectiveness has not at all been important or national
courts have not been concerned about reaching Community-wide standards
and the vague consumer expectation test gave sufficient flexibility to apply
standards of their domestic laws. Given the products liability directive's very
limited effects in terms of harmonizing the notion of a "defective product,"
one wonders how much harmonizing effect the proposed warranty directive
will have.
iii) Warranty Claims and Privity
The Commission initially had suggested to allow consumer claims for
breach of warranty directly against the producer, regardless of a privity
element."' The Commission made several arguments in favor of the
producer's warranty-based liability. It reasoned, for example, that it would be
counterintuitive to make the producer liable if a defective product caused
personal injury or damages to property, but could not be liable for the simple
nonfunctioning of the product.'92
The Commission's Internal Draft also suggested extending warranty
liability to the producer who was responsible for the product's nonconformity
with the contract. The producer could be held liable if the products did not
conform to producer's public statements, including statements in advertising,
or if they were not fit for the ordinary use and they did not conform with the
qualities the consumer could reasonably expect. 93 In other words, the
producer would have been liable for the consumer's direct economic loss
resulting from the breach of express warranties and implied warranties of
191. See Internal Draft, supra note 162, art. 4. The Draft's suggestion to extend warranty claims is
limited, however, to claims of direct purchasers. Since the proposed directive covers only cases of
direct economic loss, it does not benefit third parties. By definition, only purchasers can suffer loss of
the bargain damages.
192. Id at 87 (referring to the Product Liability Directive, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29). Arguments
raised during preparation of the directive appear remarkably similar to those raised in the debate about
strengthening consumer protection elements in the UCC. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 116, at 1583-84.
The Warranty Green Paper's language, emphasizing modem marketing conditions and the
consumers' reliance on the producer's implied guarantee that products are suitable for use,
COM(95)520 final at 86-87, is reminiscent of cases like Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d
69 (N.J. 1960), where courts for the first time abolished the privity requirement for actions based on
breach of implied warranties.
193. Internal Draft, supra note 162, art. 4(1) (referring to Article 2(2)(b) (conformity with
producer's public statements), Article 2(2)(c) (fitness for ordinary use), Article 2(2)(e) (conformity
with legitimate consumer expectations)).
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merchantability. 194
The producer's direct liability for breach of warranty would not have
introduced a completely new liability concept in Europe. In Member States
like France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, courts have extended a warranty-like
liability to manufacturers.19 Warranty-based actions and tort-based actions
largely have collapsed into one notion of liability.'96 Finland recently
introduced producer's warranty liability by statute.197 In the United Kingdom,
moreover, the DTJ Consultation Paper considered the same methods to make
the producer liable for breach of wan-anties, even in the absence of a
contractual link between the producer and consumer.'
The producer liability concept of the Internal Draft, however, is not
included in the officially published Commission proposal for a directive.
Presumably, it was too radical for many Member States. It certainly was also
opposed by industry.' 99 What remains in the Commission's official proposal
are provisions in Article 2(2)(d) and Article 3(5) which can be viewed as a
much more modest version of the Commission's original direct liability
concept.200
The producer's (indirect) liability for breach of warranty under the official
proposal has two elements. First, Article 3(2) provides that the producer's
public statements are treated like express warranties.20 ' Second, Article 3(5)
envisages the seller's right to recover in an action against the producer, if the
seller's liability for breach of warranty is the result of an act by the producer.
This provision will cover Article 3(2) situations where the producer's public
194. This liability would have extended the producer's liability under the product liability
directive (which covers only personal injury and property damages) to the consumer's direct economic
loss, i.e. ordinary loss of the bargain damages. Importantly, the proposed warranty directive is limited
to damages in the form of direct economic loss. See supra note 181 and accompanying text,
concerning the relationship between product liability and breach of warranty claims.
195. See, e.g., Warranty Green Paper COM(93) 509 final at 87; Internal Draft, supra note 162, at
15. For France, which provided the model followed by the other two countries, see Muriel de
Courrgues, France, in EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY 101 (Patrick Kelly & Rebecca Altree eds.
1992).
196. These countries' entire no-fault product liability laws are essentially based on the notion that
the producer is irrebuttably responsible for defects of the product.
197. Internal Draf, supra note 162, at 15.
198. See Warranty Green Paper, COM(93)509, final at 86-87 (including references to other
national laws); DTI Consultation Paper, supra note 176, at 8-10.
199. See COM(95)520 final at 12.
200. The Commission has moreover indicated that the concept of producer liability might
resurface in the future. See 1996 O.J. (C 309) 7, recital 11.
201. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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statements created consumer expectations that resulted in a breach of
warranty. Article 3(5) goes further, however, because liability resulting from
"any act of commission or omission by the producer" enables the seller to
seek remedies against the producer. This broad language apparently includes
situations where the producer is responsible for a production defect or design
defect which was the basis for a successful warranty claim against the
seller."2
The effectiveness of Article 2(5) and Article 3(5) as instruments to create
the producer's indirect warranty liability, however, will be limited. Article
3(5) is one of the few nonmandatory provisions in the draft directive.
Producers with the necessary economic power vis-A-vis their distributors and
sellers will most likely be able to exclude their liability, depending on the
lawfulness of such exclusion in their national laws. This means that the
directive's goal of creating more equal competitive conditions will also be
limited.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion demonstrates that the Community has pursued a
limited agenda in the area of consumer protection. The measures adopted by
the Community did not introduce standards of protection that went beyond
existing Member State consumer protection laws. The same conclusion will
most likely apply once the currently pending directive concerning warranties
in consumer contracts has been adopted. This assessment should not come as
a surprise. Nor should it be disappointing, despite occasional complaints by
consumer rights advocates. It is appropriate for the Community to focus on
the integration of markets and harmonization of Member State laws. A
Community consumer policy that is independent of Member State laws is
likely to fail, because consumer protection must be based on Member State
laws.
Differences between Member State contract laws also make far reaching
reforms more difficult. In particular the second part demonstrated some of the
problems that arise when the Community engages in consumer protection
202. The producer as defendant in an action brought by the seller presumably could raise Article
3(2) defenses, even if the seller had failed to raise them when he was sued by a consumer for breach of
warranty. If the producer is able to demonstrate, for example, that the consumer's purchasing decision
was not influenced by the producer's public statements, he should be able to avoid liability vis-A-vis
the seller.
Washington University Open Scholarship
672 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 75:627
measures that are related to Member State contract laws. This experience only
confirms the conclusion of the Community's limited role in terms of
strengthened consumer rights. Member States will continue to be the principal
place of consumer protection activities.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/15
